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Abstract  A relevant issue in the philosophy of science is the demarcation problem: how 
to distinguish science from nonscience, and, more specifically, science from 
pseudoscience. Sometimes, the demarcation problem is debated from a very general 
perspective, proposing demarcation criteria to separate science from pseudoscience, but 
without discussing any specific field in detail. This article aims to focus the demarcation 
problem on particular disciplines or theories. After considering a set of demarcation 
criteria, four pseudosciences are examined: psychoanalysis, speculative evolutionary 
psychology, universal grammar, and string theory. It is concluded that these theoretical 
frameworks do not meet the requirements to be considered genuinely scientific. 
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1 Introduction 
The demarcation problem is the issue of how to differentiate science from nonscience in 
general and pseudoscience in particular. Even though expressions such as “demarcation 
problem” or “pseudoscience” were still not used, some consider that an early interest for 
demarcation existed as far back as the time of ancient Greece, when Aristotle separated 
episteme (scientific knowledge) from mere doxa (opinion), holding that apodictic 
certainty is the basis of science (Laudan 1983, p. 112). Nowadays, the issue of 
demarcation continues being discussed. Certainly, demarcating science from 
pseudoscience is not a topic of exclusive philosophical interest. Scientists and members 
of skeptical organizations such as the Committee for Scientific Inquiry also deal with this 
crucial theme.  
     The issue of how to recognize pseudoscience not only affects academia. It is well 
known that people spend huge amounts of money annually on alternative medicine. 
Adults in the United States spend $30 billion per year on alternative and complementary 
medicine (Nahin et al. 2009, 2016). But this is not just a problem of money. Alternative 
medicine can kill indirectly due to the omission of appropriate treatment (Lim et al. 2010). 
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Trends based on pseudoscientific beliefs, such as the anti-vaccination movement and HIV 
denialism, have clear negative consequences for the population. It is so important to 
analyze science as it is to scrutinize its imitation. Pseudoscience is a complex and 
influential phenomenon in society. Therefore, the demarcation problem is a theoretical 
matter with practical implications. 
     Given the fact that pseudoscience is relatively common in the non-scientific 
environment, it is unsurprising that pseudoscience also proliferates in academia. The 
scientific community adopts a tacit methodological skepticism—theories are generally 
not accepted without solid empirical evidence. However, sometimes unscientific 
approaches emerge in a science and start to be gradually accepted. In some cases, it is 
relatively easy to separate scientific practices from non-scientific ones. For example, 
there is wide consensus in the scientific community that parapsychology, scientific 
creationism, intelligent design, graphology or homeopathy are pseudoscientific practices. 
Hansson (2013, chap. 4) considers that for scientists it is generally as easy to distinguish 
science from pseudoscience as it is to ride a bicycle: it is a form of tacit knowledge, 
something that cannot be fully explained in explicit terms but it is easy to execute. 
Nonetheless, in certain cases it is more complicated to determine whether a discipline is 
scientific or not. In effect, some disciplines have created a long debate on its 
epistemological status since its conception.  
     This paper discusses the general aspects of the demarcation problem (section 2) as 
well as some of the pseudoscientific practices that have emerged in the past decades. In 
particular, four theoretical frameworks are analyzed: psychoanalysis (Section 3), 
speculative evolutionary psychology (Section 4), universal grammar (section 5) and 
string theory (section 6). 
 
2 Demarcation Problem 
The purpose of this section is to present and discuss the basics of the demarcation 
problem. Section 2.1 briefly describes some perspectives of the philosophers of science 
on the demarcation problem, including Popper’s notion of falsifiability and the puzzle-
solving criterion adopted by Kuhn. In section 2.2 the validity of four demarcation criteria 
is defended. 
2.1 Historical context      
The first to use the expression “demarcation problem” in the philosophy of science was 
Karl Popper. According to Popper himself, he started to ponder the demarcation problem 
in 1919, when he was only 17 years old (Popper 1962, p. 33). Popper employed the term 
“demarcation problem” to denote the matter of how to distinguish science from 
pseudoscience and metaphysics (Popper 1959/2002, p. 11, 1962, p. 33).  
     Popper proposed a new criterion to separate science from pseudoscience: the criterion 
of falsifiability. Popper argued that theories must be falsifiable to achieve scientific status. 
A theory is falsifiable if it can be refuted by experience (Popper 1959/2002, p. 18). 
Theories that cannot be refuted by counterexamples are untestable (or unfalsifiable, or 
irrefutable) (Popper 1962, p. 37). 
     For Popper, supporting evidence is the result of genuine attempts to test a theory, that 
is, unsuccessful attempts to falsify it (1962, p. 36). Popper (1983, p. xx) cited Einstein’s 
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equivalence principle as an example of falsifiable hypothesis, since it can potentially be 
contradicted with several observations or experiments. Importantly, Popper (1962, p. 37) 
classified as unfalsifiable those theories that introduce ad hoc reinterpretations or excuses 
to avoid refutation when counterexamples appear. Thus, Popper considered that 
astrology, the Marxist theory of history and psychoanalysis are not refutable, therefore 
unscientific.  
     The historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn was also interested in the 
demarcation debate. To differentiate science from pseudoscience, Kuhn proposed the 
puzzle-solving criterion: a paradigm or theoretical framework is scientific if it solves 
puzzles and it is unscientific if it does not solve puzzles. In his famous book The structure 
of scientific revolutions, he described puzzles in the following manner: “Puzzles are, in 
the entirely standard meaning here employed, that special category of problems that can 
serve to test ingenuity or skill in solution” (Kuhn 1970b, p. 36). In this context, puzzles 
are the problems that scientists face in normal or established science, such as closing the 
gap between observations and theoretical predictions (Marcum 2005, pp. 63-64). In a later 
essay, Kuhn (1970a) compared astronomy with astrology and concluded that astrology 
“had no puzzles to solve and therefore no science to practice” (p. 9). Kuhn (1970a) held 
that astronomers are engaged in puzzle-solving when they re-examine their theories as a 
consequence of unexpected observations, while astrologers are not involved in research 
puzzles since they never “attempt to revise the astrological tradition” (p. 9).  
     A serious objection to the puzzle-solving criterion is that some theoretical frameworks 
can solve puzzles despite not being falsifiable (e.g., universal grammar, as discussed in 
section 5.9). It is therefore a redundant criterion, since some theoretical frameworks can 
solve puzzles without being falsifiable, but no theory can be falsifiable without solving 
puzzles, so with falsifiability the puzzle-solving criterion becomes unnecessary. 
     Kuhn criticized Popper’s notion of falsifiability. He considered that falsification does 
not occur with a refuting or falsifying instance, but with the replacement of a new theory 
or paradigm over the old one. Thus, according to (Kuhn 1970b) falsification “consists in 
the triumph of a new paradigm over the old one” (p. 147). The main problem is that Kuhn 
does not separate two related but different concepts: (1) replacement and (2) refutation. 
The fact that a paradigm has been replaced does not always imply that it has been refuted 
or falsified. For instance, psychoanalysis has been replaced by other frameworks in 
psychology but not fully falsified, since it is a discipline largely unfalsifiable (as discussed 
in section 2). Behaviorism was also largely replaced by cognitivism during the cognitive 
revolution that began in the mid-1950s, without being totally refuted. The principles of 
behaviorism remain particularly useful for clinical psychology under cognitive-
behavioral therapy. In sum, the reason why a theoretical framework is unfalsifiable is 
because it is formulated in a way that avoids refutation, not because it does not allow new 
paradigms or theories.  
     Popper and Kuhn put, respectively, a single demarcation criterion: falsifiability and 
puzzle-solving. Other authors interested in the issue have adopted a multi-criteria 
approach and have established a list of criteria for identifying pseudoscientific practices 
(Bunge 1991; González 2016, pp. 11-14; Mahner 2013, pp. 41-43). The multi-criteria 
approach is advantageous. Science is a complex activity that cannot be identified with a 
single criterion. However, a very big list of demarcation criteria is unpractical, since it 
becomes difficult to memorize and apply. Ideally, no more than five demarcation criteria 
should be necessary to recognize pseudoscience. 
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2.2 Demarcation criteria 
To discriminate between two different types of activities some kind of criteria or 
standards are necessary. It is argued that the following four demarcation criteria are 
suitable to distinguish science from pseudoscience: 
1. Testability. Science must be testable. Hypotheses and theories are testable if they 
have the inherent capacity to generate both supporting and refuting evidence 
(Caldwell et al. 2018a). An empirical test of a theory is a rigorous procedure 
carried out to decide whether the theory can be accepted or not considering both 
supporting and refuting evidence. A theory must be falsifiable to be genuinely 
testable: if a theory does not admit refuting evidence it is unnecessary any kind of 
research, since such a theory can always be defended as plausible regardless of 
the observations. For instance, the hypothesis “unicorns might exist in remote 
planets or parallel universes” is unfalsifiable and thus unscientitic. 
           
2. Evidence. Hypotheses and theories need to be supported by evidence at some 
point to achieve scientific status: either supported by the available evidence of its 
time or by evidence found some years after its inception.  
     Scientists do employ working hypotheses which sometimes are found to be 
unsupported by evidence. But while working hypotheses are useful for science, 
they are not scientific until they have been supported by evidence. Ultimately, 
hypotheses which have never been supported by evidence are rejected and 
excluded from the domain of science. 
     Occasionally, some theories are superseded or become obsolete when they are 
no longer supported by evidence or a better theory appears. To cite an example, 
Dalton’s atomic theory has been superseded by more accurate atomic models, 
since it has been found that the atom is not indivisible. Even if Dalton’s atomic 
theory is not supported by current evidence, it is still a scientific theory because it 
was supported by the available experimental evidence of its time.  
     Testability (= falsifiability) is a necessary but not sufficient condition to have 
science, as it is also necessary for a theory to be supported by evidence at some 
point to be scientific. Some pseudosciences are indeed falsifiable. Wakefield’s 
hypothesis that the MMR vaccine causes autism is not defended as plausible in 
academia since it has been falsified (Taylor et al. 2014). In other words, 
Wakefield’s hypothesis on autism is unscientific because it is unsupported by 
evidence. Andrews and Thompson’s hypothesis that depression is an adaptation 
is falsifiable but not supported by evidence and hence not scientific (more about 
this in section 4.1). Both astrology and phrenology are indeed falsifiable and have 
been falsified by empirical research (for a refutation of astrology see Carlson 
1985; for a refutation of phrenology see Parker Jones 2018). Astrology and 
phrenology are pseudoscientific because its main hypotheses were assumed to be 
correct from the beginning, despite the fact that they have never been supported 
by rigorous evidence. 
 
3. Reproducibility. Hypotheses based on experimental studies with low 
reproducibility are unscientific. Reproducibility is described as the capacity of 
separate researchers to find the same (or very similar) results when repeating an 
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experiment or test (Resnik and Shamoo 2016). The reproducibility of experiments 
is a crucial feature of modern scientific research. 
 
4. The 50-year criterion. In contemporary science (from 1950 onwards), if a new 
hypothesis or theory fails to become scientific within 50 years and keeps being 
defended, then it is a pseudoscience. This criterion is new and needs a longer 
exposition and clarification than the other ones.                
     The 50-year criterion is a practical criterion to distinguish protoscience from 
pseudoscience. A protoscience is an embryonic or emerging science, that is, a 
field which is still not scientific but eventually develops into a proper science 
(Bunge 1984, p. 44). On the other hand, a pseudoscience is a field which is 
regarded by its practitioners as scientific, even though it does not meet the 
necessary requirements to be a genuine science. To complicate more things, some 
pseudosciences can—at least in principle—become science, provided they 
become testable and supported by evidence.  
     Following the 50-year criterion, in the context of contemporary science (from 
the 1950s onwards) the difference between protoscience and pseudoscience is the 
following: while a protoscience is a field which becomes scientific within less 
than 50 years, a pseudoscience is a field which fails to become scientific within 
50 years and perhaps forever. The difference between pseudoscience and 
protoscience is better illustrated with examples. A paradigmatic example of 
pseudoscience is acupuncture, while a good example of protoscience that 
successfully became science is the Higgs Boson, first proposed in 1964 (Higgs 
1964) and discovered in 2012, 48 years later (Aad et al. 2012).  
     Three doubts may remain in the reader: (1) Why is the 50-year criterion 
specifically applied from 1950 onwards?, (2) Can a theory be regarded as 
pseudoscience even if 50 years have not passed since its inception?  and (3) Why 
is it said that some pseudosciences can potentially become science? The three 
questions are answered in the lines below. 
     (1) Why is the 50-year criterion specifically applied from 1950 onwards? 
Because the technology to test theories employed by scientists before 1950 was 
not so well developed as today and some protosciences needed more than 50 years 
to develop into science. For instance, Einstein’s 1916 prediction of the existence 
of gravitational waves was initially protoscientific, since it was not testable with 
the technology of his time. It was tested and supported by evidence (and thus 
became fully scientific) more than 50 years later, when in the late 1970s strong 
indirect evidence of the existence of gravitational waves was found from 
observations of orbital decay in the Hulse-Taylor binary pulsar (Taylor et al. 1979; 
Weisberg et al. 1981).  
     (2) Can a theory be regarded as pseudoscience even if 50 years have not passed 
since its inception? Yes. The 50-year criterion is applied to theories which cannot 
be tested with the technology of the moment and are said to be “testable in 
principle” or “testable in the future”. If a testable hypothesis is found to be 
unsupported by evidence but is still being defended as plausible, then it can be 
regarded as pseudocientific, even if 50 years have not passed since its inception. 
To cite an instance, Jacques Benveniste’s homeopathic hypothesis about “water 
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memory” was almost immediately considered pseudoscience by the scientific 
community (Hirst et al. 1993). 
     (3) Why is it said that some pseudosciences can potentially become science? 
The differences between chess and checkers are real, but what specifically 
constitutes chess and what specifically constitutes checkers is completely decided 
by humans. Analogously, the differences between protoscience and 
pseudoscience are real, but what specifically constitutes protoscience and what 
constitutes pseudoscience is decided by humans, since those categories are 
human-made. The traditional conception of pseudoscience as a field that can never 
become scientific should change, since it is not practical. Thus, it should be 
accepted that some pseudosciences can become science—at least in principle—
provided they become testable and supported by evidence at some point. 
     This new characterization of pseudoscience is useful to abandon theories in 
contemporary science which fail to achieve scientific status in 50 years or more 
(of course this abandonment can be revised, provided that the theory has been 
tested and supported by evidence). With the old characterization of pseudoscience 
as a field that can never become scientific, scientists would hesitate to classify 
some approaches as pseudoscientific for millenials, if not forever, since then 
theories said to be “potentially testable in the future” could only be determined to 
be protoscience or pseudoscience a posteriori.  
     Imagine this hypothetical scenario: a new theory in a scientific field makes its 
first appearance in 2020. It is a theory which cannot be tested with the technology 
of the moment. In the year 18020 there is no empirical evidence supporting the 
theory, but its holders still maintain that it is a legit research field because it is 
testable in principle and it will be possible to empirically support it with more 
advanced technology. This scenario seems to be largely implausible, and the 
reason is clear: a theory which has not been tested and supported by evidence 
cannot be considered scientific (or protoscientific) forever, an emergent theory 
will either mature into science or not. Thus, it is useful to adopt the criterion 
according to which in contemporary science, if a new theory fails to become 
scientific within 50 years and keeps being defended, then it is a pseudoscience. 
Otherwise, a theory which is not supported by evidence could be defended ad 
infinitum, under the promise that it will be supported with the advent of new 
technology which will make new observations possible.  
Any field needs to meet all these four demarcation criteria to be scientific. Based on these 
criteria, the four aforementioned theoretical frameworks (psychoanalysis, speculative 
evolutionary psychology, universal grammar and string theory) will be examined in the 
next sections. 
 
 
3 Psychoanalysis 
Psychoanalysis is a theoretical framework related to the study of the mind, particularly 
the unconscious mind, as well as a form of psychotherapy. Sigmund Freud initiated the 
discipline in the 1890s. During the first half of the twentieth century, psychoanalysis was 
the main school of psychology along with behaviorism. However, nowadays 
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psychoanalysis has lost much of its popularity. In the following lines, it is discussed 
whether or not psychoanalysis is a scientific field. 
3.1 Unfalsifiable hypotheses 
One of the most important psychoanalytic concepts is the Oedipus complex. Freud 
(1899/1913) said: “Perhaps we are all destined to direct our first sexual impulses towards 
our mothers, and our first hatred and violent wishes towards our fathers” (p. 223). The 
positive Oedipus complex refers to a child's unconscious sexual desire for the opposite-
sex parent and jealous hatred for the same-sex parent. On the other hand, the negative 
Oedipus complex refers to a child's unconscious sexual desire for the same-sex parent 
and hatred for the opposite-sex parent (Auchincloss 2015, p. 110; Schultz and Schultz 
2005, p. 65). Freud (1905/2001) argued that the Oedipus complex is a universal 
phenomenon which leads to neurosis when it is unresolved: “Every new arrival on this 
planet is faced by the task of mastering the Oedipus complex; anyone who fails to do so 
falls a victim to neurosis” (p. 226). 
     Psychoanalysts consider that repression is the psychological mechanism in which 
desires and impulses are kept out of consciousness (Kellerman 2009, p. 213). Therefore, 
the diagnosis of the Oedipus complex is essentially unfalsifiable: even when the complex 
is not observable, it can be said to be repressed. The Oedipus complex also exhibits 
problems of testability if we consider the psychoanalytic concept of reaction formation. 
According to psychoanalytic theory, reaction formation occurs when, in response to an 
initial feeling perceived to be unacceptable, an opposite emotional reaction occurs—e.g. 
someone can exhibit sweetness in response to an aggressive desire (Kellerman 2009, p. 
209). As a consequence, the Oedipus complex is also unfalsifiable in cases where a child 
loves or hates both of their parents. If a child loves both of his parents, the Oedipus 
complex can be declared to be repressed through reaction formation: the child can be 
repressing his hate for the father in the form of affection. Conversely, if a child hates both 
of his parents, he can be said to be repressing the love for his mother in the form of 
reaction formation.  
      Another unfalsifiable assumption of psychoanalysis is penis envy. Freud proposed 
that penis envy constitutes a phase of development in girls. According to Freud 
(1905/2001) little girls “are over-come by envy for the penis—an envy culminating in the 
wish, which is so important in its consequences, to be boys themselves” (p. 195). 
Contemporary psychoanalysts still debate the penis envy hypothesis. For instance, Zepf 
and Seel (2016) explicitly argue that “the daughter wants to have the father’s penis” (p. 
415). Penis envy is considered to be an unconscious desire (Zepf and Seel 2016, p. 404). 
Thus, the existence of penis envy is not a testable hypothesis. If little girls are asked 
whether they are envious of boys’ penises, it does not matter their answer, since  
psychoanalysts still can claim that the desire is unconscious. 
     Freud (1899/1913) also proposed the thesis that “wish fulfillment is the meaning of 
every dream” (p. 113). However, Freud was aware that nightmares seem to refute this 
generalization. What solution did he propose? We must differentiate “the manifest and 
the latent dream content” (Freud 1899/1913, p. 114, emphasis in original). If a person has 
a nice dream, Freud’s idea is confirmed. If the same person has a nightmare, the 
hypothesis is also confirmed, since the psychoanalyst can reinterpret the latent dream 
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content as wish fulfillment. In other words, whatever a person dreams, the dream will 
always be a wish fulfillment. The wish fulfillment hypothesis is obviously unfalsifiable.  
     An additional unfalsifiable hypothesis is the existence of the id, ego and superego. 
Freud divided the mind in these abstract constructions. The id refers to the instincts and 
pleasure-seeking, the superego is related with the morality system of the subject, and the 
ego is the part which mediates between the demands of id, superego and reality (Yakeley 
2017). Popper (1962) considered that “for Freud’s epic of the Ego, the Super-ego, and the 
Id, no substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made for it than for Homer’s 
collected stories from Olympus” (p. 38). The existence of these highly abstract notions 
cannot be meaningfully tested: whatever is observed can be interpreted as evidence in its 
favor.  
3.2 Psychodynamic psychotherapy 
Pychodynamic (or psychoanalytic) psychotherapy is the form of clinical practice based 
on the theoretical body of psychoanalysis (Cabaniss et al. 2011, Chapter 2; Summers and 
Barber 2010, p. 11). There is mixed evidence with regard to the efficacy of 
psychodynamic psychotherapy. A number of empirical studies suggest that cognitive-
behavioral therapy (CBT) is more effective than psychodynamic psychotherapy to deal 
with bulimia nervosa (Poulsen 2014), social anxiety disorder (Egger et al. 2016) or panic 
disorder (Chambless et al. 2017). In addition, many meta-analyses suggest that CBT is 
superior to psychodynamic psychotherapy (Canceil et al. 2004; Mayo-Wilson et al. 2014; 
Tolin 2010; Zhou et al. 2015). On the other hand, other meta-analyses indicate that there 
is no significant difference between CBT and psychodynamic psychotherapy in terms of 
efficacy (Leichsenring 2001; Steinert et al. 2017).  
     Post hoc ergo propter hoc (“after this, therefore because of this”) is a logical fallacy 
that occurs when it is assumed that just because an event followed another, the first event 
caused the second. The fact that some patients experience symptom remission after 
receiving psycodynamic psycotherapy does not necessarily imply that it is a result of the 
psychodynamic psycotherapy in itself. It is known that patients can remit symptoms of 
mental disorders by means of placebo effect (Boulenger et al 2014; Mayo-Wilson et al. 
2014; Zhu et al. 2014). In this regard, a large meta-analysis found no significant difference 
between psychodynamic psychotherapy and the placebo group (Mayo-Wilson et al. 
2014). Remission of the symptoms after the psychodynamic psycotherapy can also be 
produced by spontaneous remission. An important percentage of people who do not 
receive any treatment experience spontaneous remission from depression (Whiteford 
2013) social anxiety disorder (Vriends 2014) and eating disorders (Vandereycken 2012). 
A recent meta-analysis found no significant clinical difference between the 
psychodynamic psychotherapy and the waiting list (Zhou et al. 2015).  
 
3.3. Neuropsychoanalysis 
In 1999, the term “neuropsychoanalysis” started to be used formally, when it was 
introduced as the title of the house journal of the International Neuropsychoanalysis 
Society (Solms and Turnbull 2011). Neuropsychoanalysis is an approach that seeks to 
synthesize neuroscience and psychoanalysis, and a scientific enterprise according to its 
holders (Németh 2011; Schwartz 2015). Among its main representatives are Mark Solms, 
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Jaak Panksepp—the co-chairs of the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society—and 
Oliver Turnbull. One of the most important books of this emerging discipline is The Brain 
and The Inner World, written by Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull. In this work, Solms 
and Turnbull try to reconcile what they call the “subjective” approach to mental science 
(psychoanalysis) with the “objective” approach (neuroscience). Solms and Turnbull 
(2002) lament that “Typically, neuroscientists have regarded psychoanalysis and related 
disciplines as ‘unscientific’ (how can a science of subjectivity be objective?)” (p. 6). 
       Solms and Turnbull are of the opinion that psychoanalytic knowledge has much to 
contribute to neuroscience. They argue that “Armed with the knowledge we have gained 
regarding the functional anatomy of the mental apparatus, it is not difficult to translate all 
of this [psychoanalytic concepts such as ego] into neuroscientific terms” (Solms and 
Turnbull 2002, p. 287). Undoubtedly, Solms and Turnbull’s proposal is groundbreaking.  
However, it should be taken with caution. Solms and Turnbull are employing the logical 
fallacy known as “false analogy”. This fallacy occurs when it is established an analogy 
between two objects, A and B, which share some properties. Then, if A has property X, 
we infer that B must also have property X. The analogy is incorrect if the two objects (A 
and B) differ in a way that affects whether they both have property X. Here is Solms and 
Turnbull’s main argument: 
 
       Both psychoanalysis [P] and neuroscience [N] are related to the study of mind. 
       P postulates X. 
       N must also postulate X. 
To try to translate psychoanalytic knowledge (id, ego, super-ego, etc.) into neuroscientific 
terms is a very similar process to attempt to translate the knowledge behind acupuncture 
(qi, meridians, etc.) in terms of scientific medicine. Neither of these translations has 
succeeded. 
     Solms and Turnbull (2002) admit that “[We] have been in professional 
situations…where our interest in psychoanalysis has made it difficult to maintain the 
respect of our colleagues, the esteem of our students, and the willingness of journal editors 
to publish our work” (p. 299). One of the main problems underlying neuropsychoanalysis 
is its academic isolation. The three neuroscience journals with highest Impact Factor are 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Nature Neuroscience and Annual Review of Neuroscience. 
No article on neuropsychoanalysis has ever been published in any of the aforementioned 
journals. Papers on neuropsychoanalysis are rarely published in general journals of 
psychology or neuroscience. Works on the matter are usually found in a single journal: 
Neuropsychoanalysis.  
3.5 Evaluation 
Unquestionably, psychoanalysis has had historical and cultural relevance. Freud’s ideas 
are part not only of the history of psychology, but also of the history of human culture. 
Freud’s doctrines were highly influential in the psychology from the first half of the 
twentieth century. The works of Freud also influenced several artists, most notably Alfred 
Hitchcock and Salvador Dalí. However, psychoanalysis does not meet the demarcation 
criteria of testability and evidence. In effect, the theoretical basis of psychoanalysis is 
largely unfalsifiable. And pychodynamic psychotherapy does not have robust evidence of 
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being as effective as CBT, since many meta-analyses suggest the superiority of CBT (with 
some meta-analyses showing no significant difference between psychodynamic 
psychotherapy and the placebo group or the waiting list). Even the most recent 
psychoanalytic formulations such as neuropsychoanalysis are pseudoscientific. 
Neuropsychoanalysis relies on false analogies to try to revitalize discredited 
psychoanalytic concepts and it is almost entirely isolated from the scientific community. 
In sum, psychoanalysis is a clear example of pseudoscience. 
 
 
4. Speculative evolutionary psychology 
 
Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby were the first to popularize the term 
"evolutionary psychology" in their 1992 book The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary 
Psychology and The Generation of Culture. According to Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 
(1992) “Evolutionary psychology is simply psychology that is informed by the additional 
knowledge that evolutionary biology has to offer” (p. 3). Thus, evolutionary psychology 
is a theoretical approach that studies psychological mechanisms from an evolutionary 
perspective. These psychological mechanisms are hypothesized to be designed to solve 
adaptive problems that humans had to confront throughout their evolutionary history. 
Evolutionary psychologists postulate that the human mind is largely composed of specific 
innate cognitive mechanisms or modules designed to solve adaptive problems (Cosmides 
and Tooby 1992, p. 166; 1997, p. 80; Pinker 1995, pp. 419-420). Several authors refer to 
this thesis as the “massive modularity hypothesis” (Frankenhuis and Ploeger 2007; 
Samuels 1998). 
        According to evolutionary psychologists, their framework is not merely a branch of 
psychology but a comprehensive approach that can contribute to the study of any region 
of psychology (Buss 2009; Chang and Geary 2007; Cosmides and Tooby 2013). 
Evolutionary psychologists study various human traits such as language (Pinker 1995), 
rape (Thornhill and Palmer 2000), memory (Nairne and Pandeirada 2008), art (Dutton, 
2009), sport (Lombardo 2012), mental disorders (Glass 2012), or human preferences in 
mate choice (Buss 1989). 
        The philosopher of science Mario Bunge (2010) was one of the first, if not the first, 
to employ the expression “speculative evolutionary psychology”. Here, the term 
“speculative evolutionary psychology” is employed to designate some areas within 
evolutionary psychology which are not well supported by evidence. Some cases of 
speculative evolutionary psychology will be examined below. 
 
4.1 Evolutionary psychology and depression 
    
The framework of evolutionary psychology has influenced clinical psychology, resulting 
in the so-called evolutionary clinical psychology (Buss 2009, p. 147, 2015, p. 407; Glass 
2012; Starrat 2016, p. 220). It is a novel approach that is still in its early stages. However, 
controversial positions are already being developed. Specifically, there are works which 
defend that depression is an adaptation. 
     Paul W. Andrews is a professor of psychology who describes himself as an 
evolutionary psychologist (Andrews 2007, p. 48). Paul Andrews, in collaboration with 
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Anderson Thomson, Jr., has published some works suggesting that depression is an 
adaptation (Andrews and Thomson 2009a, 2009b, 2011). Andrews and Thompson argue 
that therapies should try to stimulate depressive meditation rather than stopping it 
(Andrews and Thomson 2009a). The authors defend the analytical rumination hypothesis 
(ARH). ARH posits that depression is an evolutionary response to complex problems. 
The mission of depression is to reduce distractions and analyze problems through 
rumination (Andrews and Thompson 2009b). According to this conception, depression 
promotes an analytical rumination in which the individual becomes more focused and 
information is processed more accurately (Andrews and Thompson 2009b, p. 622). Thus, 
over evolutionary time, depressive rumination often helped people to solve the problems 
that caused their episodes (Andrews and Thompson 2009b, p. 622). 
     To support their hypothesis, Andrews and Thompson (2009b, p. 621) emphasize the 
universality of depression: symptoms of depression have been found in virtually every 
human culture that has been studied. Following this logic, schizophrenia or myopia 
should also be considered adaptations, because both seem to be an existing feature of 
every human culture (Fricke et al. 2018; Jablensky and Statorius 1988; Rudnicka et al. 
2016). However, it is hardly conceivable that schizophrenia or myopia are adaptations. 
     Andrews and Thompson (2009a, 2009b, p. 644) argue that depressive rumination may 
help to solve the problems that originated the depressive episode. At this point, as has 
been noted by Coyne (2010), there is a problem. To be considered a biological adaptation, 
a trait must be something more than “useful”. It should enhance fitness, that is, it must 
increase an individual’s capacity to propagate its genes. The main maladaptive 
consequence of depression is suicide. More than half of all people who die by suicide 
meet criteria for depressive disorder (Hawton and Heeringen 2009). In addition, while the 
cross-national lifetime prevalence of suicidal attempts is 2.7% for the overall population 
(Nock et al. 2008), the cross-national lifetime prevalence of suicidal attempt is about 31% 
for individuals with major depressive disorder (Dong et al. 2018).  
     Certainly, Andrews and Thompson focus their hypothesis on major depression 
(Andrews and Thompson 2009a, Andrews et al. 2011). Andrews and Thompson (2009a) 
cite a study by Kruijshaar et al. (2005) where it was estimated indirectly that 30% of men 
and 40% of women in the Netherlands and Australia will have at least one episode of 
major depression during their lifetime. According to Andrews and Thompson, this is 
difficult to explain given that mental disorders should not be common. Several objections 
can be made against their argument. First, the study they cite is likely to be overestimating 
the lifetime prevalence of major depression in the Netherlands, since other studies have 
found the lifetime prevalence of major depression to be 17.9% in the Netherlands (Bromet et 
al. 2011). Second, mental disorders are indeed relatively usual. The World Mental Health surveys 
estimate the inter-quartile range (IQR; 25th-75th percentile) lifetime prevalence of mental 
disorders to be 18.1-36.1% across countries (Kessler et al. 2009). Third, a common trait is not 
necessarily an adaptation (being common is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a trait to 
be an adaptation, since it must have some beneficial function as well). For instance, the global 
prevalence of myopia is estimated to be about 34% of the world population by 2020 (Holden et 
al. 2016), with East Asian countries having a high prevalence of myopia (80%-90%) among 
young adults (Wu et al. 2016), but it does not imply that myopia is an adaptation.  
     If depression is an adaptation, we would expect it to be predominant in contemporary 
human tribes, since they represent the closest indirect evidence we have of the Pleistocene 
conditions of life. In a long study that examined over 3.000 individuals from two 
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American Indian tribes, it was found that the prevalence of depression was very low, only 
about 10% (Libby et al. 2005). With that extremely low depression prevalence, the 
hypothesis that depression is an adaptation seems to be refuted. An adaptation is a trait 
which has been favored by natural selection through successive generations. Hence, an 
adaptation is a predominant trait in a species, meaning that the great majority of 
individuals of a species should have the adaptation. For instance, no one would claim that 
giraffes’ long neck is an adaptation if only 10% of giraffes had long necks. And no serious 
researcher would say that human bipedalism is an adaptation if only 10% of humans 
walked on two legs. For depression to be an adaptation, around 80-90% of members of 
contemporary tribes should experience it. Of course, it can be argued that contemporary 
tribes differ in important ways from the Pleistocene conditions. But that would make the 
adaptationist hypothesis about depression unfalsifiable, thus unscientific either way.  
4.2 The JSIM hypothesis 
The jealousy as a specific innate module (JSIM) hypothesis states that natural selection 
shaped sexual jealousy as a psychological mechanism to prevent paternal uncertainty, and 
emotional jealousy as a psychological mechanism to prevent resource loss (Buss et al. 
1992; Harris 2003; Lishner et al. 2008; Fussell et al. 2011). According to evolutionary 
psychologists, during their evolutionary history, men and women have faced different 
adaptive problems. Men have faced the adaptive problem of paternal uncertainty. Men 
could be investing resources in others’ offspring. In men, an adaptive problem affecting 
fitness is sexual infidelity. Women meanwhile, face another risk: a man can stop investing 
time and resources in their offspring, by adopting a new relationship with another woman. 
Presumably, the emotional infidelity of a man is an indicator of the risk.  
     Following the evolutionary reasoning derived from the JSIM hypothesis, evolutionary 
psychologists predict that men are more upset than women by sexual infidelity, while 
women are more upset than men by emotional infidelity. In the words of David Buss 
(2006): “Male jealousy, more than women’s, is triggered by signals of sexual 
infidelity….Women’s jealousy, more than men’s, is activated by signals of emotional 
infidelity” (p. 256). Evolutionary psychologists also predict that men are more upset by 
sexual infidelity than emotional infidelity, while women are more upset by emotional 
infidelity than sexual infidelity. To quote the evolutionary psychologists Buunk,  
Angelitner,  Oubaid and Buss (1996): “As predicted by models derived from evolutionary 
psychology, men…exhibit greater psychological and physiological distress to sexual than 
to emotional infidelity of their partner, and women have been shown to exhibit more 
distress to emotional than to sexual infidelity” (p. 359).  
     Inspired by the influential article of Buss et al. (1992), evolutionary psychologists have 
dedicated special attention to the study of jealousy for more than 25 years, obtaining some 
results showing sex differences in jealousy (Bendixen et al. 2015, Buss et al. 1999, 
Frederick at al. 2014). Many of the empirical studies that have been conducted to test the 
sex differences in jealousy have used forced-choice questions, where college students had 
to imagine a hypothetical situation of partner infidelity. These questions are taken from 
Buss et al. (1992). Students are asked to imagine a relationship and identify what kind of 
scenario would be more distressing: (a) imagine your partner having sex with another 
person or (b) imagine your partner falling in love with another person. Using this forced-
choice format it has been found sex differences in jealousy, where men tend to consider 
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more distressing sexual infidelity than women, while women tend to be more distressed 
upon emotional infidelity than men. These results have been reported in western and 
Asian countries (Buss et al. 1992, Buss et al. 1999). Evolutionary psychology predictions 
have also been confirmed in studies employing continuous measures (Bendixen et al. 
2015). 
     To assess the possible limitations of the forced-choice format traditionally used, 
Lishner et al. (2008) conducted an interesting experiment. College students were 
randomly assigned to either a traditional forced-choice group or another group with a 
modified format. Participants in the traditional forced-choice group should mark with an 
X which option seemed the most upsetting of the following: (a) imagining your partner 
having several sexual positions with another person or (b) imagining your partner falling 
in love with another person. Participants in the group of the modified format in addition 
to the above received an additional option: (c) any of the above options would upset me 
equally. In the traditional forced-choice group, men found most upsetting sexual infidelity 
than women, and women found most upsetting emotional infidelity than men. But in the 
group of the modified format, most students of both sexes (62% of women and 70% men) 
found both forms of infidelity equally distressing. These results suggest that if 
participants are given the traditional forced-choice format in which they have to decide 
which kind of infidelity they find more distressing (sexual vs. emotional), many 
participants will respond randomly, since they can find both types of infidelity equally 
distressing. 
     At least 26 studies have failed to reproduce the specific sex differences in jealousy 
predicted by evolutionary psychologists (Buller 2005; Canto et al. 2009a, 2009b, 2011; 
Carpenter 2012; Costa and Silva-Barros 2008; DeSteno 2002; Dijsktra et al. 2013; Dunn 
2015; Gómez-Jacinto et al. 2001; Green and Sabini 2006; Grice and Selly 2000; Harris 
2000, 2002, 2003; Kato 2014a, 2014b; Larocque 2015; Leeker 2012; Lishner et al. 2008; 
Nannini and Meyers 2000; Penke and Asendorpf 2008; Pines and Friedman 1998; Sabini 
and Green 2004; Sabini and Silver 2005; Webber 2018).  
     Many of the articles which do not reproduce the JSIM predictions have very big 
sample sizes of 500 participants or more (Canto 2009b, 2011; Green and Sabini 2006; 
Kato 2014b; Larocque 2015; Sabini and Green 2004). In addition, while some meta-
analyses do corroborate evolutionary psychology predictions on jealousy (Sagarin 2012), 
others do not find support for the JSIM hypothesis (Buller 2005; Harris 2003; Carpenter 
2012). 
     The JSIM hypothesis exhibits a low degree of reproducibility, since a colossal number 
of studies have been unable to reproduce the specific sex differences in jealousy predicted 
by evolutionary psychologists. A hypothesis based on experimental studies with low 
reproducibility cannot be considered scientific.  
 
4.3 Evaluation  
 
Evolutionary psychology is a theoretical framework that can produce both scientific and 
pseudoscientific research. Evolutionary psychologists have the merit of having placed 
special emphasis on remembering the important role that natural selection has had in 
shaping human behavior. In particular, research in evolutionary psychology has made 
scientific and relevant contributions to the study of human preferences in mate selection 
(Chang et al. 2011; Sorokowski et al 2015; Zhang et al. 2014). However, in its speculative 
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version, evolutionary psychology is a pseudoscience. Examples of speculative 
evolutionary psychology include the adaptationist hypothesis about depression (which is 
incompatible with empirical evidence) and the JSIM hypothesis (which has a low degree 
of reproducibility). The field of evolutionary psychology would greatly benefit from other 
disciplines’ constructive criticism to avoid getting stuck in speculative ideas and keep 
developing its more promising hypotheses.  
 
 
5. Universal Grammar        
One of the most influential notions in the history of linguistics is the Universal Grammar 
(UG) theory. The nativist approach to the study of language has its roots in this 
conception. UG is a fairly relevant issue in current linguistics. It is not without reason that 
UG is among the most studied and debated topics in linguistics thus far. 
     What is UG? This question must be addressed with caution. Some researchers consider 
that there is little consensus on what UG is, and what constitutes it (Dabrowska 2015; 
Tomasello 2004). To avoid any kind of confusion, this article refers to the definition of 
UG formulated by the famous linguist Noam Chomsky, because it is the standard and 
established definition of the concept. 
     Even though Chomsky’s previous works already alluded to “universal grammar” 
(Chomsky 1965), it was not until the publication of Reflections on Language that 
Chomsky explicitly defined UG. According to Chomsky: “Let us define ‘universal 
grammar’ (UG) as the system of principles, conditions, and rules that are elements or 
properties of all human languages not merely by accident but by necessity—of course I 
mean biological, not logical, necessity” (Chomsky, 1975, p. 29). UG is defined to be “part 
of the genotype” (Chomsky 1980, p. 66), and thus an “innate property of the human mind” 
(Chomksy, 1975, p. 34). 
     These are the main arguments used to defend the existence of an innate UG: 
 
1. Language as an instinct 
2. Speed, ease and uniformity of language learning 
3. Poverty of the stimulus 
4. Linguistic universals  
5. Species specificity of human language 
6. Brain specialization for language 
7. Critical period 
 
 All of them will be examined in the following sections.  
 
5.1 Language as an instinct 
 
An argument that can be used to hold the existence of an innate UG is to assert that 
language is an instinct. If language is an instinct, then children can be expected to be born 
with tacit grammatical knowledge. According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, an 
instinct is “an innate, typically fixed pattern of behaviour in animals in response to certain 
stimuli” (Stevenson 2010, p. 906). Thus, an instinct is, by definition, an innate behavior. 
That is, an instinct must be encoded in the genome. 
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     Before discussing the language as an instinct hypothesis, a clarification is needed. 
Many linguists propose a false dichotomy between “acquire” and “learn” with regard to 
language. For example, Harley (2001, p. 136) suggests that children acquire their first 
language because they do it largely unconsciously, while they learn a second language 
because they do it consciously. Such a dichotomy is flawed because it implies that there 
is no such thing as first language learning. Indeed, learning is divided into explicit (or 
conscious) and implicit (or unconscious). Implicit learning is learning of information 
without awareness of what has been learned (Seger 1994). Children implicitly learn the 
first language. First language learning involves implicit learning and second language 
learning involves explicit learning. Thus, in this paper the world “learn” will be used—
rather than “acquire”—to refer to first language learning. 
     Steven Pinker was the first to popularize the hypothesis that language is an instinct. In 
his influential book The Language Instinct, Pinker asserts that “people know how to talk 
in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs” (Pinker 1995, p. 18). 
Pinker’s analogy is striking, since it is obviously incorrect. A spider will spin webs even 
if it remains isolated since birth. On the other hand, a child who has been isolated since 
birth will not learn language. In other words, while web-spinning does not require 
previous experience and it is innate, language does require experience and it is learned.  
     The 2008 documental A life without words shows how two deaf siblings who grew up 
in a rural farm of Nicaragua did not learn any language (Isenberg 2011). They did not 
learn any sign language because their parents did not know sign language. It is difficult 
to see how language can be an instinct here. Both siblings had the stimulus of having each 
other to talk with, which should have been enough to spontaneously create a language. 
To live with a sibling should be a stimulus powerful enough for the supposed language 
instinct to emerge. To say that linguistic stimulus is only received when a child sees other 
people talking is like saying that the hunting stimulus is only received when a lion sees 
other lions hunting. In fact, zoo lions raised in captivity hunt birds that have accidentally 
entered their cage (Zachos 2018). It illustrates that a real instinct like hunting is activated 
as soon as a non-domesticated lion sees a prey to hunt, while a false instinct like language 
does not emerge as soon as a child sees another person to talk with. 
     Not even the strong linguistic stimulus of being exposed to speech through TV is 
enough to fully learn language. A prime example comes from Jim, a hearing child of deaf 
parents who frequently watched TV and occasionally played with some friends (Sachs et 
al. 1981). Jim’s parents used sign language but did not directly sign to him (which is 
difficult to explain, since if language is an instinct, the parents should have been naturally 
inclined to sign to their son). When Jim was almost 4 years old, his linguistic skills were 
well below age level and had not learned the grammar of English. Jim was exposed to 
both spoken English (through frequently watching TV and occasionally playing with 
friends) and sign language (through seeing his parents), but did not learn either until adults 
started to talk directly to him.  
     Some authors have made an analogy between birdsong and human language (Bolhuis 
et al. 2010; Fehér et al. 2009). Such an analogy is flawed for the following two reasons: 
           
1. Human language is infinitely more complex and radically different from birdsong. 
Language can refer to the future and the past, employ irony, communicate complex 
abstract ideas like morality, justice, spirit or time, and refer to every single object 
of the environment. Birds do not produce complex human-like semantics which 
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refers to basically every object of the environment, nor do they communicate 
complex abstract notions, employ irony or refer to the future and the past. 
 
2. Songbirds raised in isolation produce an isolate song before being exposed to a 
wild-type song, while children raised in isolation do not produce an isolate syntax 
before being exposed to language. For instance, zebra finches which are kept alone 
in soundproof chambers during their development produce an isolate song 
different from the wild-type song (Féher at al. 2009). It supports an instinctive 
component of birdsong, since zebra finches produce an isolate song before being 
exposed to the species’ typical song. On the other hand, feral children—those who 
have grown isolated from human contact—never exhibit an isolate syntax before 
being exposed to language. No feral child has been reported to create new 
sentences with an invented or isolate syntax when they are first found. The famous 
feral child Genie produced ungrammatical sentences after being exposed to 
English for some time, but when she was first found she was virtually speechless 
and did not produce ungrammatical sentences with an isolate syntax. In fact, well 
documented feral children like Genie, Oxana Malaya or Danielle Crockett were 
basically speechless when found.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that every human society has language does not support the 
existence of a language instinct. Some entirely learned traits like the use of clothing items 
are found among all human cultures. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines clothes as 
“items worn to cover the body” (Stevenson 2010, p. 329). Following this definition, 
according to which clothes are items worn on the body, all human societies have some 
form of clothing, since no human tribe is fully naked or free from items worn on the body. 
And there is no known “clothing gene”, nor is there any evidence that feral children lost 
in the wild typically create simple clothing items like loincloths. In fact, many feral 
children like Victor of Aveyron (Watkins 1999, p. 147),  the Cambodia’s “jungle girl” 
(MacKinnon 2007) or Traian Căldărar (Leidig 2002) were found naked in the wild, which 
rebuts the existence of an innate tendency to create clothing items 
     In definitive, the thesis that language is an instinct is not supported by empirical 
evidence. As derived from models from empirical linguistics (Sampson 2001; 2007), 
linguistic anthropology (Everett 2012) and cognitive linguistics (Tomasello 1995; 2010), 
language is better understood as a cultural tool. 
 
5.2 Speed, ease and uniformity of language learning  
 
Generative linguists hold that children learn language with speed, ease and uniformity, 
which could support the existence of an innate UG. This section discusses the plausibility 
of this argument. 
  
Speed: generative linguists suggest that children learn language quickly (Chomsky 1959; 
Vikner 1995, p. 9). Nonetheless, according to Dąbrowska (2015) children do get a great 
amount of linguistic data. Dąbrowska calculates that, if children are exposed to language 
about 8 hours per day, they get 11.680 hours of exposure between the ages of 1 and 5 
years (4 x 365 x 8 = 11680). 11.000 hours can be considered abundancy of stimulus. Why 
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are 11.000 hours of practice and exposure to language considered “fast” rather than 
“normal” learning? The consideration that language learning is fast rather than normal is 
largely subjective. And science must be objective. 
     Even if we were to admit that language learning occurs relatively fast, it does not 
suggest that there is innate knowledge of syntax. Three-year-old children can learn 
quickly to play both chess (Chidi 2014, p. 453; Serafica 2017) and small-sized violins 
(Starr 1976/2000, p. 20). With only one month of practice, some 2-year-old Asian 
children can play simple songs like “Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star" on small-sized violins 
(Annelies 2016). No one would say that children have innate domain-specific knowledge 
of chess or violin skills. Therefore, the argument “X is learned quickly, so there must be 
innate domain-specific knowledge of X” is not correct. 
     Children aged 3-4 who can play chess, already know the vast majority of chess rules, 
even though they do not play like an adult with more experience and knowledge of 
strategy (Serafica 2017). Analogously, three-year-old children already have tacit 
knowledge of the majority of the rules of their native language, but they do not have the 
same vocabulary range or syntax complexity of an adult (Nippold 2004). It can be 
objected that language cannot be compared to playing chess or the violin, since it is a 
more complex ability. But that would represent an example of double standard logic. If 
children learn language quickly, they are assumed to have innate domain-specific 
knowledge of the rules of grammar. If children learn to play chess or the violin quickly, 
they are not assumed to have innate domain-specific knowledge of chess or violin skills. 
Instead of applying the same objective standard, things are judged by different standards 
depending on whether they favor linguistic nativism.  
     Another possible objection would be that language learning is a universal 
phenomenon, unlike learning to play chess or the violin. But language learning is only 
universal among human populations, not among human individuals. Feral children do not 
talk when they are found—unless they have learned language before being isolated—
illustrating that they have not learned language. Not only feral children, but also normal 
deaf children raised in isolated farms do not have sign language sometimes (Isenberg 
2011). Furthermore, the fact that language learning occurs in every human society does 
not support the existence of an innate grammar. As described before, some entirely 
learned traits are present in all human cultures, like the use of clothing items (if clothes 
are defined simply as items worn on the body, all human societies have some kind of 
clothing).  
 
Ease: Chomksy (1975, p. 4) argues that children learn language easily since they do it 
without formal instruction or conscious awareness. The argument “X is learned without 
formal instruction or conscious awareness, so there must be innate domain-specific 
knowledge of X” is not valid, since children can learn many things solely from experience 
without formal instruction and conscious awareness. This is better illustrated with feral 
children examples. Vanya Yudin, nicknamed the “Russian Bird boy”, was kept isolated 
by his mother in a room surrounded by cages containing dozens of birds. His mother 
never talked to him, and when he was found at age 7 he could only communicate by 
chirping and flapping his arms like a bird (Cockcroft 2008). Obviously, Vanya did not 
have innate knowledge of bird-like behavior, yet he learned it without formal instruction 
or concious awareness. Oxana Malaya was neglected by her alcoholic parents and lived 
with dogs since she was 3 until she was found at age 8. When she was rescued, she walked 
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on all fours, narked and behaved like a dog (Grice 2006). Oxana learned dog-like behavior 
without proper instruction or awareness. There are also examples outside feral children. 
The chess legend José Raúl Capablanca explained that he learned to play chess at the age 
of 4 without formal instruction, just by watching his father’s games with a friend 
(Capablanca 1920/1966, p. 4).  
Uniformity: some authors have defended that language learning is remarkably uniform 
(Barry 2002, p. 184). However, a recent review article concluded that individual 
differences in language learning are the norm rather than the exception, with grammatical 
competence also varying across development (Kidd et al. 2018, p. 158). Dąbrowska 
(2015) points out that grammatical development is far from uniform since some kids 
begin to combine words at age 14 months, while others do not perform so until after their 
second birthday. 
5.3 Poverty of the stimulus 
Poverty of the stimulus is the argument that children are not exposed to enough linguistic 
data to fully learn language, hence the need to postulate some innate tacit knowledge of 
grammar (Chomksy 1986, p. 55; Dąbrowska 2015).  A classic example of the poverty of 
the stimulus argument is the structure-dependence principle, a grammar rule which 
Chomsky argued to be innate in children (Chomsky 1975, p. 32-33). However, it is 
difficult to conceive it as innate knowledge when children do make structure-dependent 
errors (Ambridge, Rowland and Pine 2008), and some rules in some languages violate 
the structure-dependent principle (Comrie 1984, p. 100; Comrie 1989, pp. 21-22). In any 
case, Chomsky used the poverty of the stimulus argument to support the innateness of 
UG: “The argument from poverty of the stimulus leaves us no reasonable alternative but 
to suppose that these properties are somehow determined in universal grammar, as part 
of the genotype” (Chomsky 1980, p. 66). 
     The two main assumptions of the poverty of stimulus argument will be examined here: 
(1) Lack of negative evidence and (2) Children acquire the competence to produce a 
potentially infinite number of sentences from exposure to a limited sample of sentences. 
 
Lack of negative evidence 
 
A related issue with the poverty of stimulus argument is the supposed lack of negative 
evidence (Dabrowska 2015). Negative evidence in language learning is information that 
denotes whether a particular utterance or sentence is ungrammatical. Negative evidence 
is usually considered necessary since without correction, the child can overgeneralize and 
generate ungrammatical sentences. A distinction is typically made between direct 
negative evidence and indirect negative evidence. Direct negative evidence occurs when 
the adults explicitly correct the child’s ungrammatical utterance with corrected repetitions 
or rejections of the utterance. Indirect negative evidence refers to the absence of particular 
input patterns, which can serve as evidence that those patterns are ungrammatical (Lust 
2007, pp. 29-30). 
     A well-known study from 1970 reported that parents do not generally correct their 
children syntactic mistakes (Brown and Hanton, 1970). However, other studies have 
failed to reproduce those results. More recent evidence suggests that parents do correct 
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their kids’ grammar mistakes with some frequency. For example, Hirsh-Pasek, Trieman 
and Schneiderman (1984, p. 86) found that parents repeated (with a correction of the 
child’s error) 20.8% of the ill-formed sentences. Bohannon and Stanowicz (1988, p. 687) 
discovered that 34% of syntactic errors and 35% of phonological errors in children 
received some kind of correcting feedback from adults in form or reformulations or 
clarification questions. Chouinard and Clark (2003) found that (a) adults reformulate 
between 41% and 60% of their children’s erroneous utterances (far more often than they 
repeat correct utterances), and (b) adults reformulate equally often all error types 
(phonological, morphological, lexical, and syntactic). In Chouinard and Clark’s study, 
children regularly acknowledged adult’s reformulations with terms like “uh-huh”, “okay” 
or “yeah”, and also repeated many adult reformulations. Chouinard and Clark concluded 
that adult reformulations offer an important source of information to correct errors in 
language learning.  
     Children also benefit from indirect negative evidence, in the form of non-occurrence 
of some input patterns. Thus, indirect negative evidence can be inferred from positive 
evidence. Children can differentiate between an accidental non-occurrence and a 
statistically significant non-occurrence, and deduce that the latter is ungrammatical 
(Regier and Gahl 2004; Stefanowitsch, 2008).  
     Some consider that positive evidence alone can provide enough data to successfully 
learn language. Hsu, Chater and Vitányi (2013) conducted a formal study and concluded 
that the learner has sufficient data to learn language from positive evidence alone, if the 
learner favors the simplest encoding of the linguistic approach. 
 
Children acquire the competence to produce a potentially infinite number of 
sentences from exposure to a limited sample of sentences. 
 
Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002, p. 1577) argue that, given the fact that children are 
only exposed to a small proportion of the possible sentences, it is difficult to explain how 
humans acquire the ability to employ a potentially infinite number of sentences (ignoring 
obvious constraints such as the limited time of human existence). Due to this limitation 
of data, they consider that the process of learning a language cannot be explained by 
general learning mechanisms like imitation, generalization, analogy and statistical 
learning, hence the need of postulating an innate property such as UG (Hauser, Chomsky 
and Fitch 2002, p. 1577). However, their observation does not represent empirical 
evidence that there is some kind of innate knowledge of syntax, since language is not the 
only domain where humans produce an infinite number of possibilities from a finite 
number of rules. Chess is a completely learned domain were humans can potentially 
produce an astronomical or even unlimited number of moves from a finite number of 
rules.  
     A possible objection is that chess requires formal learning. But this is not necessarily 
the case. As mentioned above, Capablanca learned to move the chess pieces by 
observation of his father’s games (Capablanca 1920/1966, p. 4). An average child 
exposed 8 hours per day to language has 11.680 hours of exposure and practice of 
language between the ages of 1 and 5 years (4 x 365 x 8 = 11680). With a similar amount 
of exposition and practice, any normal child would easily learn chess without formal 
instruction. If a child were stimulated by adults to observe two chess games per day 
between the ages of 4 to 5, he would have observed 1.460 chess games in just 2 years (2 
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x 365 x 2 = 1.460). Any normal 5 years old child would know how to move the chess 
pieces after having observed 1.000 chess games or less, and without needing any “formal 
teaching”, just by observing others playing. More so, if adults correct about 20-30% of 
children’s incorrect chess moves when they start to play, like they do when they 
reformulate children’s incorrect sentences.  
     Another conceivable objection against this analogy is that chess does not really 
represent a system of potentially infinite moves, unlike language and its unlimited 
potential. Again, this is not always necessarily the case. In 2014, the FIDE/World Chess 
Federation added a rule that made the possible moves of a tournament chess game 
necessary finite, forcing automatically a draw “if any series of at least 75 moves have 
been made by each player without the movement of any pawn and without any capture” 
(World Chess Federation 2014, section 9.6). Nonetheless, before 2014 it was theoretically 
possible to produce a potentially infinite number of moves in a tournament chess game. 
There are two important rules to force a draw: the 50-move rule and the threefold 
repetition rule, both of which require a player to claim the draw (World Chess Federation 
2014, section 9.2). Before 2014, in a hypothetical chess game where none of the players 
wanted to claim a draw, they could have theoretically played as long as they wanted. In 
effect, they could have played as long they were unable to find checkmate—which can 
be difficult sometimes, like in the case of the Bishop and Knight checkmate. If the players 
were playing fast enough, they could have remained playing without being out of time.      
     Crucially, in unofficial or friendly chess games played without following the 75-move 
rule (or even the 50-move rule and the threefold repetition rule), chess can have a 
potentially infinite number of moves from a limited number of rules. Whether these 
informal games can be considered “genuine chess” despite not following all the FIDE 
rules is not relevant for the present discussion. The point is that humans have domains 
where it is possible to create a potentially infinite number of possibilities from a finite 
number of rules, and it does not represent evidence of domain-specific innate knowledge. 
     Claud Shannon famously estimated the number of possible chess board positions to 
be roughly 1043. Hence, the number of possible board positions in chess is extremely big 
but finite. To have an unlimited number of possible moves in chess, it is necessary to 
repeat board positions. But the same occurs with language. The number of words in any 
language is finite. To have an infinite number of possible sentences in a language, it is 
necessary to repeat words. The number of sentences in a language would be finite if 
repeating words were not allowed. Unless we consider adding numbers to a sentence, 
which would make the set of natural numbers infinite rather than language per se. Indeed, 
some languages like Pirahã exhibit a virtual absence of words for numbers (Gordon 
2004).  
5.4 Linguistic universals  
Linguistic universals are patterns which are found among all languages. Generative 
linguists have proposed several linguistic universals as components of UG, such as the 
structure-dependence principle, the Complex NP Constraint, the Island Constraint, 
Subjacency, Binding Conditions, constituency and syntactic recursion. However, it is 
disputed whether these so-called “universals” are universal conditions of grammar or 
constituent of all languages. There is evidence of violations of the structure-dependence 
principle (Comrie 1984, p. 100; Comrie 1989, pp. 21-22), the Complex NP Constraint 
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(Allwood 1982), the Island Constraint (Sampson 2005, p. 157), Subjacency, Binding 
Conditions and constituency (Evans y Levison 2009) as well as syntactic recursion 
(Everett 2005; Futrell et al. 2016).  
     Even less controversial claims for linguistic universals, such as the distinction between 
nouns and verbs, have found some opposition from studies from the syntax of Straits 
Salish (Jelinek and Demers 1994). The same applies to the proposed universality of 
adjectives, which has been challenged by the Northern Iroquoian languages (Chafe 2012). 
Anyhow, the most typical examples of linguistic universals are (1) nouns and verbs, (2) 
vowels and consonants and (3) interjections: 
 
(1) Nouns and verbs. Proponents of the UG theory consider that the distinction 
between nouns and verbs is innate and part of the UG (Foley 2005, p. 47). It is 
true that some fMRI studies report that nouns and verbs are processed by different 
brain locations (Mestres-missé et al. 2010). However, other fMRI experiments 
made with Chinese people did not find any significant difference in the brain 
processing of nouns and verbs (Li et al. 2004, Yang et al. 2011).  Another study 
found no significant difference in brain activity with abstract nouns and verbs 
(Moseley and Pulvermüller 2014). If the noun/verb distinction were innate, the 
difference in brain processing should be observable in all fMRI studies of 
individuals with no brain damage, which is not the case.  
     Interestingly, children generally learn nouns faster than verbs. It has been 
suggested that noun learning is easier to conceptualize than verb learning, since 
nouns are more individuated and refer to objects or specific entities while verbs 
are more relational terms which need other referents for meaning (Pulverman et 
al. 2006, p. 135). 
 
(2) Vowels and consonants. The distinction between vowels and consonants is 
sometimes argued to be innate as a component of UG (Smitth and Allott 2016, p. 
183; Nespor et al. 2003, p. 24). To consider the vowels/consonant distinction 
innate, empirical studies should show (a) different brain area activation for vowels 
and consonants, (b) a universal pattern of different sensitivity to vocal and 
consonant mispronunciations in infants and (c) same or similar sensitivity 
between different types of consonant mispronunciations (e.g., onset consonants 
with voicing change compared with coda consonants with place of articulation 
change). 
     With regard to (a), some fMRI experiments have shown different brain 
activation patterns for vowels and consonants (Carreiras and Price 2008). 
Nonetheless, other PET scans have shown that the same brain areas are activated 
when using either vocals or consonants during word reconstruction tasks (Sharp 
et al. 2005). The only difference was the amount of activation, it was greater for 
the consonant replacement, as we would expect, since it is a more complex task. 
     Concerning (b), many studies have found that 12-month-old and 20-month-old 
English-learning infants have no significant difference in sensitivity toward vocal 
and consonant mispronunciations (Floccia et al. 2014; Mani and Plunkett 2007; 
Mani and Plunkett 2010).  
      About (c), a recent ERP study found that 8-month-old infants showed brain 
sensitivity to onset consonant mispronunciations but not to coda consonant 
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mispronunciations (Von Holzen et al. 2018). In other words, the infants of this 
study did not support an innate brain sensitivity for consonants as a specific 
linguistic category, otherwise infants would have had sensitivity toward both 
onset and coda consonant mispronunciations.  
 
(3) Interjections: interjections are sometimes cited as an example of linguistic 
universal (Ameka 1992), with some considering them to be innate (Ferguson 
1996, p. 134). But interjections are conventionalized, as well as language-specific 
and need to be learned. Even though some interjections are similar across 
languages, the differences outweigh the similarities by far (Strange 2009, p. 60). 
Children learn the specific interjections of their native language because their 
parents and people of their environment use them. Also, feral children have not 
been observed spontaneously using interjections that they have not heard before. 
 
In sum, even when all human languages do share some vanishingly few universals, it does 
not represent evidence that there is innate tacit knowledge of the rules of grammar. As 
mentioned before, some universal traits among human populations are entirely learned, 
such as the use of clothing items.  
     Also, it is difficult to explain why many feral children who have not been significantly 
exposed to language fail to use these universals when they are found. A well-documented 
case of a feral child is found in Danielle Crockett, a girl who was found at age 7 in a home 
where she was maintained in deplorable conditions and isolated from human contact. 
Danielle Crockett was absolutely unable to talk or even pronounce a single word when 
she was found (DeGregory 2008; DeGregory 2017). In other words, Danielle Crockett 
did not use any of the so-called linguistic universals. The same applies to other feral 
children like Vanya Yudin who had not learned to talk when he was found (Cockcroft 
2008). So human linguistic “universals” are only strictly universal among human 
populations, rather than among human individuals.  
 
5.5 Species specificity of human language 
 
Even though other animals have communication systems, none of them is so complex as 
human language. Clearly, human language would not be possible without the specific 
human anatomy (complex brain, human-like vocal tract and a high degree of mobility of 
the hands). Human beings exhibit a bigger brain and have more neurons in the cerebral 
cortex than any of their close living relatives such as chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas 
(Herculano 2011; Roth 2005). This notorious difference in the complexity of the brain 
could explain why nonhuman great apes have not shown to be able to fully learn human 
sign language, despite having great freedom of movement with hands. 
     Chomsky has claimed that because language is uniquely human, it must be considered 
innate (Chomsky 2000, p. 50). But the fact that something is exclusively human does not 
make it innate. The ability to play chess is also uniquely human, yet no one has claimed 
that chess-specific knowledge is innate. No single chimpanzee or bonobo knows how to 
play chess. There is no empirical evidence suggesting that chimpanzees or bonobos can 
correctly play chess (i.e., understanding the game, including abstract notions such as 
checkmate, and moving the pieces correctly). The capacity to learn to play chess is innate, 
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but chess-specific knowledge is learned. Analogously, the capacity to learn language is 
innate, but linguistic-specific knowledge is learned. 
 
5.6 Brain specialization for language 
 
Proponents of the UG theory usually defend two arguments to support the existence of a 
brain specialization for language: (1) Some brain structures are specifically adapted for 
language and (2) Dissociation between language and general cognition.  
(1) Some brain structures are specifically adapted for language: some authors 
consider that certain brain structures are specifically adapted for language, which 
would represent evidence of the neural basis of UG (Stromswold 2000, p. 925). 
The most often cited brain structures traditionally considered to be only 
implicated in language tasks are Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas. However, more 
recent research suggests that both areas are involved in non-linguistic functions 
or tasks. Broca’s area is involved in motor functions which include complex hand 
movements and manipulation of objects (Binkofskia and Buccinoc 2004). Recent 
fMRI data indicate that Wernicke’s area is activated for musical imagery—the 
experience of imagining music without hearing it (Zhang et al. 2017). 
     Another largely linguistic area is the arcuate fasciculus (AF). Nonetheless, the 
AF is relevant for both language and music development (Chen et al. 2018). 
Musicians exhibit an increased fractional anisotropy in the AF compared to non-
musicians (Halwani et al. 2011). And amusic individuals have a reduced volume 
in the right anterior AF compared with non-amusic individuals (Chen et al. 2018). 
     None of the so-called “language areas” of the brain are exclusively implicated 
in language-specific tasks, and so they do not support the UG theory, which 
presupposes that the human brain is specifically hard-wired for grammar. 
 
(2) Dissociation between language and cognition: it has been proposed that there is 
a double dissociation between language and cognition (Curtiss 1981; Gazzaniga 
and Smylie 1984, Pinker 1991). The postulated dissociation comes from both (a) 
individuals with language impairment and overall normal cognition, and (b) 
individuals with impaired general cognition but overall good language skills. Let 
us examine both data sources. 
 
(a) Individuals with language impairment and overall normal cognition: the 
data come mainly from children with Specific Language Impairment (SLI), a 
proposed condition in which language difficulty occurs in the absence of other 
developmental deficits. First of all, it should be noted that modularity can be 
a product of development, so SLI does necessarily support innateness 
(Paterson et al. 1999). Also, SLI has been contested, with some researchers 
considering SLI not specific of language but also affecting other areas of brain 
functioning, including memory (Hill 2001; Ullman and Pierpont 2005; Lum 
et al. 2010). There is evidence that people with language impairment perform 
significantly worse on non-linguistic tasks than people with intact language, 
these deficits are found in accuracy, strategy, learning rate and procedural 
memory tasks (Kemény and Lukàcs 2010; Lee and Tomblin 2014).  Children 
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who satisfy the diagnostic criteria for SLI (by having a non-verbal IQ in the 
typical range), sometimes decline the non-verbal IQ when they get older 
(Botting 2005).  
     The nativist premise is the following: because some children appear to 
have a specific trouble with their linguistic performance while having normal 
cognition, then language is dissociated/different from cognition. To assert that 
because a child has a poor performance specifically in X, X is not part of 
cognition, is not a valid logic. Following that logic, if a child has a specific 
trouble with mathematics (dyscalculia), it would follow that mathematical 
knowledge is not part of cognition. Some children are excellent in chess, 
while others are horrible even after years of practice (Fraga González et al. 
2018), just like we observe differences in children’s reading skills or 
mathematical skills, yet no one has proposed that reading, playing chess or 
mathematical abilities are not part of cognition. 
     The Oxford Dictionary of English defines cognition as “The mental action 
or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, 
experience, and the senses.” (Stevenson 2010, p. 337). As it is possible to 
acquire knowledge with both explicit and implicit learning, not all the 
knowledge or information which composes cognition is necessarily conscient. 
In the scientific literature, it is common to find allusions to unconscious 
cognition or tacit cognition (Kiefer 2012; Ray 2009; Wokke et al. 2011). 
Hence, both conscious and tacit components of language are part of cognition 
(Kihlstrom 2007).  
 
(b) Individuals with impaired general cognition but overall good language  
skills: the most typical cited example comes from individuals with Williams 
Syndrome (WS) (Karmiloff-Smith et al. 2006, p. 54). Nonetheless, this 
example is misleading. To be a genuine dissociation, language should be fully 
intact in WS individuals and equal to any person who does not share the 
condition, not only relatively good considering WS is a cognitive disorder. 
Individuals with WS do not possess an intact language. There is vast evidence 
that individuals with WS—including adolescents and adults—do not have 
intact various linguistic areas such as syntax and pragmatics, and their 
language learning differs from typically developing children (Grant et al. 
2002; Karmiloff-Smith et al. 1997, 1998; Laws and Bishop 2004; Benítez-
Burraco et al. 2016). Also, there is no significant difference between linguistic 
tests of children with WS and children with SLI (Stojanovik et al. 2004). 
Therefore, it cannot be said that language in WS is almost intact, and SLI 
clearly affects language. 
  
5.7 Critical period 
A critical period can be defined as a developmental window during which certain 
experience has a bigger effect than at other times (Trainor 2005). Certain researchers have 
suggested that the existence of a critical period for first language learning supports the 
existence of an innate UG (Cenoz 2003, p. 61). This is usually defended with an analogy 
between the development of language and vision (Singleton and Ryan 2004). There is 
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evidence of critical periods in visual development, it has been observed that depriving a 
kitten of normal visual experience during a period of early postnatal life irreversibly 
changes neuronal connections in the visual cortex (Wiesel and Hubel 1963). But the 
analogy between the development of language and vision is wrong, since the visual 
development is not shaped by culture, unlike language. If two twin brothers are separated 
at birth and one of them is raised by his Russian-speaking mother in Russia while the 
other one is raised by his English-speaking father in England, they will learn two radically 
different languages despite developing the same visual system.  
     There are critical or sensitive periods for early brain development, since the 
developing brain has higher plasticity than the adult one (Hensch and Bilimoria 2012). 
This is clearly observable in cases of feral children. The feral child Genie was found in 
1970 when she was 13, after having spent her whole childhood almost entirely isolated 
in a dark room. Due to her lack of human interaction, Genie did not learn language 
throughout her childhood. After years of reintegration and several tests, it was concluded 
that Genie was not able to fully learn English grammar. Genie learned a broad vocabulary, 
but her sentences typically lacked grammatical coherence (Fromkin et al. 2010, p. 63).  
     Genie’s score in nonverbal tests of cognitive abilities was far below the age-
appropriate level. In May 1973, when Genie was 16, she performed the nonverbal test 
Leiter International Performance Scale and her score was of 6-8 year level (Curtiss 1981) 
Genie’s performance in the nonverbal test Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices was 
also overall poor and well below age-level (Curtiss 1977, p. 230). 
     Based on the available evidence, Genie showed a critical period for brain development 
in general, rather than for language in particular, since it affected cognition and many 
non-linguistic brain functions, as illustrated by her poor nonverbal tests performances. 
Genie never performed at a normal and age-related level in general nonverbal tests like 
the Leiter scale. Thus, it was a critical period for brain development, not a critical period 
for language in itself. The same applies to other feral children, there is no evidence that 
the critical period only affects language processing. As a consequence, feral children do 
not support the hypothesis that the brain is specifically hard-wired for grammar.  
     It is possible to contest that, even if the critical period is not specific to language, it 
does affect language, supporting nativism in that sense. Thus, the nativist logic would be 
as follows: “if X is affected by the critical period of brain development, then the brain is 
hard-wired or specifically configurated from birth for X”. Following this reasoning, the 
human brain could be specifically hard-wired for chess. Nobody has tested feral 
children’s abilities at chess. If Genie or Danielle Crockett cannot learn to play chess or, 
if compared with an experimental group of people who start playing chess, their overall 
chess skills are far below the experimental group, then it should be concluded that the 
human brain is hard-wired for chess (following the nativist logic described above). It can 
be objected that chess skills depend to some degree on language ability. Such an objection 
is invalidated by the fact that the critical period does not affect language per se, but brain 
development in general. Consequently, the fact that a particular skill or trait is affected 
by the critical period of brain development does not necessarily imply that such a trait is 
hard-wired in the brain. 
 
5.8 Is UG falsifiable? 
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There have been solid critiques of UG: Cowie (2017), Dąbrowska (2015), Tomasello 
(2004; 2009); Ibbotson and Tomasello (2016), Lin (2017). None of these valid critiques 
have been accepted by the proponents of UG. A common criticism is that generative 
linguists do not require all components of UG to be universal, hence making the UG 
theory unfalsifiable (Dąbrowska 2015; Evans and Levinson 2009; Tomassello 2009). 
     Karl Popper held that to differentiate science from pseudoscience it is necessary to 
determine whether a theory is testable/falsifiable. Popper considered that some theories 
are unfalsifiable by means of introducing new ad hoc reinterpretations or excuses to 
escape refutation (Popper 1962, p. 37). The thesis that human grammar is entirely learned 
or created is falsifiable. The observation that all feral children which are born with a 
normal brain employ the same linguistic universals when they are found, would 
automatically refute the view that human grammar is entirely learned or created.  
     UG theory postulates that there is some innate tacit knowledge of the rules of grammar, 
including syntax. If children who have not been significantly exposed to language do not 
possess linguistic knowledge, then the assumption that there is innate knowledge of the 
rules of grammar should be refuted. The observation that Danielle Crockett and other 
feral children did not know any word when found, should have refuted a long time ago 
UG and the proposed innateness of linguistic “universals” (linguistic universals are only 
universal among languages, not among human individuals). Nonetheless, generative 
linguists make ad hoc excuses to avoid refutation. They argue that linguistic competence 
is not the same as linguistic performance (Chomsky 1965, p. 4) and subsequently assume 
that feral children lack a specific vocabulary rather than innate knowledge of syntactic 
rules. This ad hoc excuse saves the theory from refutation but makes it unfalsifiable. Feral 
children are simply assumed to have innate linguistic knowledge regardless of the 
observations. If feral children talk UG is confirmed, and if feral children do not talk UG 
is also assumed. 
     According to Tomasello (2009), to use the term “universal grammar” to simply denote 
linguistic universals or grammar across all languages but without alluding to any innate 
linguistic knowledge is a misuse of the term, since historically the term refers to innate 
linguistic-specific knowledge rather than general aspects of human cognition. Tomasello 
argues that it is not the notion of linguistic universals what is dead, but rather, the idea 
that there is innate linguistic-specific knowledge. Certainly, to claim that the UG theory 
does not refer to innate linguistic-specific knowledge would be a strategy to avoid 
falsification by creating new definitions of UG. Both traditional and contemporary 
definitions of UG explicitly defend the existence of innate linguistic knowledge 
(Chomsky 1975, p. 32-33; Vikner, 1995, p. 9). 
 
5.9 UG and Kuhn’s puzzle-solving criterion 
 
Syntactic recursion has been proposed as the only uniquely human characteristic of 
language (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 2002). Therefore, it would be expected to observe 
syntactic recursion in all human languages as a fundamental property of UG. The work 
developed by Everett (2005) and Futrell et al. (2016) with the Pirahã tribe could have 
refuted the universality of syntactic recursion. Consequently, UG theorists can, at least in 
principle, make some accommodations between theoretical predictions and observations, 
solving puzzles in this sense. But the Pirahã tribe can only falsify the universality of 
syntactic recursion, not UG per se. Even if the universality of syntactic recursion were 
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refuted, the UG theory would remain unfalsifiable for three reasons: (1) UG is usually 
considered to be composed of more properties than merely syntactic recursion, (2) it can 
be argued that not all the components of UG require to be universal, and (3) the proposed 
innateness of linguistic-specific knowledge would remain irrefutable (it is assumed that 
the universality among languages of a few linguistic traits implies its innateness and the 
counterexample of feral children is ignored). Hence, the UG paradigm can solve puzzles, 
despite not being falsifiable. UG illustrates that the puzzle-solving demarcation criterion 
proposed by Kuhn is not useful to identify some unscientific practices.  
 
5.10 Evaluation 
 
UG theory does not meet two demarcation criteria: testability and evidence. UG is 
unfalsifiable, since generative linguists make ad hoc excuses to avoid refutation when 
counterexamples appear. The main arguments and observations used to maintain the 
existence of an innate UG have been examined here. None of these observations 
genuinely support the notion that there is innate tacit knowledge of the rules of grammar, 
therefore UG is not supported by empirical evidence. In short, UG is a pseudoscience. 
     Fortunately, new promising approaches are emerging in the recent years in the field of 
linguistics in general, and language learning in particular. The research conducted in 
usage-based linguistics (Diessel 2014; Ibbotson and Tomasello 2016; Tomasello 2003, 
2010) is more empirically based than the UG framework. Ibbotson and Tomasello (2016) 
argue that it is necessary a paradigm shift in linguistics, with the UG theory needing to 
be changed by the usage-based linguistics approach. Usage-based linguistics can provide 
an empirical framework to investigate language learning as well as the use, similarities, 
differences and historical development of the existing 6,000 languages. 
 
 
6. String theory 
 
One of the ultimate goals in physics is to find a theory able to unify general relativity with 
quantum mechanics, since both theoretical frameworks are largely incompatible. While 
general relativity focuses on gravity and large scale phenomena like planets, galaxies and 
so forth, quantum mechanics focuses on the non-gravitational forces (electromagnetic, 
weak and strong forces) and small scale phenomena like sub-atomic particles, atoms, etc.  
     String theory has been described as a “theory of everything”, that is, a theory which 
attempts to unify gravity with the other fundamental forces—electromagnetic, weak and 
strong forces (Van den Heuvel 2016, p. 170). In other words, string theory is considered 
to have the potential to reconcile and unify general relativity with quantum mechanics. 
Thus, string theory has important theoretical implications. However, in the last years there 
has been an increasing number of skeptic remarks toward this theoretical framework. 
Some of the main methodological problems concerning string theory are discussed in the 
following sections. 
   
6.1. The basics 
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The central assumption of basic string theory is that elementary or fundamental particles 
are not point-like particles but one-dimensional “strings”, which have the dimension of 
length. In this theoretical framework, strings are the basic constituents of matter. These 
strings can vibrate in different manners and the distinct modes of vibration produce 
distinct types of particles. The rough estimate of the string length scale is the Planck 
length, about 10-33 cm (Szabo 2004, p. 3). M-theory, the modern theoretical extension of 
string theory, in addition to strings, has higher-dimensional objects known as  “p-branes”  
(Gaunlett 1998). 
     Importantly, the theory is not considered in the normal four-dimensional spacetime 
(three spatial dimensions and time). Extra dimensions are required to achieve 
mathematical consistency. The first version of string theory, the bosonic string theory, 
required 26 dimensions. The bosonic string theory describes the class of particles known 
as bosons, but not fermions. Later, string theories that included the study of fermions and 
supersymmetry were called superstring theories. By the mid-1980s, there were five 
consistent superstring theories, and all of them required 10 dimensions. These five 
superstring theories were later unified into a broader theory called “M-theory”. M-theory 
postulates the existence of 11 dimensions. In string theory, the characteristic first rough 
estimation of the size of extra dimensions is not much distinct from the Planck scale. 
However, recently some string theorists are considering the possibility of larger 
dimensions (Dine 2015, p. 431). 
     A key notion in modern string theory is supersymmetry, a proposed symmetry between 
the two types of elementary particles: fermions and bosons. It predicts that each of these 
types of particles has a superpartner, that is, every fermion has a boson superpartner and 
every boson has a fermion superpartner. 
 
6.2 The problem of testability 
 
The hypothesized superpartners predicted by supersymmetry have not been detected by 
the Large Hadron Collider at CERN. Indeed, the supersymmetry assumption cannot be 
falsified since string theorists do not have a definitive prediction about the mass of 
superpartners (Chaudhuri 2016, p. 8). Still, evidence of supersymmetry would not make 
string theory fully testable since the existence of extra dimensions must also be tested.  
String theorists postulate the existence of tiny extra dimensions which are unobservable—
at least with current technology. If extra dimensions are indeed postulated to be about the 
size of the Planck length, some consider that those dimensions will remain undetected in 
the foreseeable future, if not forever (Chaudhuri 2016, p. 8; Zwiebach 2009, p. 9). It 
makes the existence of extra dimensions virtually impossible to confirm. Extra 
dimensions are also unfalsifiable, no definitive estimation of the size of extra dimensions 
exists (Randall 2006). Lisa Randall, a well-known advocate of string theory, has claimed 
that “People have often made the mistake of believing only in what they could see. (…) 
String theory is another reason to believe extra dimensions might exist” (Randall 2007). 
It is not a very convincing assertion, extra dimensions should be accepted by empirical 
evidence rather than faith.  
     The string theorist David Gross has suggested that string theory is perfectly scientific 
because it is testable in principle (Castelvecchi 2015). A theory is testable in principle if 
it can be potentially tested in the future, and testable in practice if it has already been 
tested. First of all, it is far from clear that string theory is testable in principle, as it depends 
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on the development of new technology—particle accelerators—which could never be 
precise enough to test the theory with falsifying experiments. Second, and contrary to 
Gross’s suggestion, testability in principle is not a sufficient condition to produce science. 
To be scientific, theories must be testable both in principle and in practice, meaning they 
should actually be tested. Furthermore, theories are not scientific until they have been 
supported by evidence at some point. Atomism was not scientific in ancient Greece, 
despite being testable in principle, since it was not meaningfully tested or supported by 
any empirical evidence. The atomic theory achieved scientific status once it was tested 
and supported by evidence with the works of Dalton, Thompson, Rutherford and Bohr. 
 
6.3 Philosophical perspectives 
The case of string theory has huge philosophical implications, especially in the context 
of the demarcation problem. The issue of the epistemic range of string theory is complex 
and has created dissimilar philosophical views. Let us briefly discuss some of the views 
on string theory among contemporary philosophers of science. 
    Mario Bunge, a physicist turned philosopher of science, is skeptic toward the epistemic 
value of string theory. Bunge is critical with string theory for two reasons: it is a theory 
protected from refutation and it has resisted experimental confirmation since its inception 
in 1968 (2010, p. 254). This reasoning has led Bunge to conclude that string theory is 
suspicious of being pseudoscience (2012, p. 6) or even science fiction (2010, p. 254). 
     Massimo Pigliucci has suggested that string theory is a form of mathematical 
philosophy (Pigliucci 2018, p. 49). Such a classification may be tempting, but it is 
inaccurate. String theory is not taught in departments of philosophy but in departments of 
theoretical physics. Researchers in the field of string theory do not promote their 
framework as philosophy. Rather, string theorists promote the theory as a theoretical 
model of physics, which is a science. Thus, string theory has always been promoted as a 
scientific theory, not as a philosophical doctrine. 
     Richard Dawid (2013), another phycicist turned philosopher, has proposed that string 
theory is redefining the way science should be understood. He argues that now it should 
be acknowledged the existence of non-empirical science. Dawid’s viewpoint is 
undoubtedly original and interesting from an epistemological perspective, but at the same 
time, it is highly controversial. Dawid’s notion of non-empirical science has been 
challenged by both philosophers (Chall 2018) and physicists (Ellis and Silk 2014). For 
instance, the astrophysicists Ellis and Silk (2014) claim that non-empirical science is an 
oxymoron, which is a correct assertion. 
     According to Dawid, string theory should be accepted because there is no better 
alternative (Dawid 2013, p. 40). Dawid’s premise is debatable as there is indeed a better 
alternative: to stop defending string theory and similar unfalsifiable “theories of 
everything” and to promote research programs with testable predictions. As Ellis and Silk 
suggest, “there may be no need for an overarching theory of four fundamental forces and 
particles if gravity, an effect of space-time curvature, differs from the strong, weak and 
electromagnetic forces that govern particles” (2014). 
     String theorists should adapt to the methodology of the rest of working scientists, not 
the other way around. The main problem with Dawid’s proposal is that it is difficult to 
see the clear boundaries between string theory and religion. Religion is also not supported 
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by any empirical evidence and unfalsifiable. Should string theory be accepted by faith 
rather than evidence? 
 
6.4 Evaluation 
 
Many physicists consider string theory an unscientific enterprise and are skeptic of the 
long-term value of research in this framework  (Bunge 2006; Chaudhuri 2016; Ellis and 
Silk 2014). In their critique of string theory and the multiverse theories, Ellis and Silk 
(2014) hold that journal editors in the field of physics should generally not accept 
speculative and untestable work and emphasize that only testable theories should be 
awarded in science. Their skepticism is justified. String theory cannot become a science 
unless there is some experimental evidence of the proposed extra dimensions and 
supersymmetry. In fact, string theory should be abandoned unless the necessary 
technology to test it with falsifying experiments is available. Otherwise, string theory 
could be maintained and defended in academia forever, despite not having any empirical 
support. 
     String theory does not meet three demarcation criteria: testability, evidence and the 
50-year criterion. String theory is unfalsifiable, since there is no definitive prediction of 
the size of extra dimensions or the mass of superpartners, and it is always possible to 
avoid refutation by claiming that these phenomena will be detected in the future with 
better technology. The main ideas of string theory—such as extra dimensions or 
supersymmetry—are still not supported by empirical evidence, and a theory which has 
never been supported by evidence cannot be considered scientific. In addition, string 
theory does not pass the 50-year criterion because it has not evolved into a scientific field 
after half a century of existence. String theory began to develop between 1969 to about 
1974 (Schwarz 2000). Especifically, the idea of a one-dimensional object (or “string”) 
first appeared between 1969 and 1970 (Schwarz 2000), and the existence of extra 
dimensions was postulated by string theorists as far back as 1971 (Lovelace 1971). In 
sum, it is safe to conclude that string/M-theory is a pseudoscience, as it does not meet the 
requirements to be deemed as science and it is promoted as a theoretical model of the 
science of physics. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Sometimes, the demarcation problem is discussed in very general terms, without 
examining any specific field in detail. Here, it was attempted to focus the demarcation 
problem on particular disciplines or theories. After discussing a set of demarcating 
criteria, four theoretical frameworks have been examined: psychoanalysis, speculative 
evolutionary psychology, universal grammar and string theory. It has been concluded that 
these theoretical frameworks are examples of pseudoscience, as they do not meet the 
requirements to be regarded as science.   
     It is important to emphasize the relevance of skepticism and critical attitude in 
scientific thought and academia in general. It is not enough with the rejection of easy to 
detect pseudosciences like astrology or ufology, which are largely ignored in academia. 
Occasionally, some pseudosciences can proliferate and be very well accepted in certain 
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scientific fields. Thus, it is crucial to adopt a critical attitude toward “high-status” 
pseudosciences, which are not so obvious to detect and have entered in academia. 
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